Overview

The significance of Greenland for the United States cannot be overstated. It is a critical aspect of the nation’s security strategy and the competitiveness of its industries. Geographically, the island is positioned between North America and Europe. Along with Iceland and the United Kingdom, it forms the GIUK Gap, a crucial zone for submarine monitoring in the North Atlantic. Additionally, from Pituffik Space Base, the US operates missile warning, missile defence, and space domain awareness systems within the framework of NORAD. Therefore, Greenland is directly connected to nuclear deterrence and modern air and space defence. Pituffik serves as a valuable logistics hub in the Arctic Circle, boasting a 3 km runway and a deep-water port. Rising temperatures and melting ice have increased Greenland’s strategic value, as new or longer-lasting Arctic shipping routes emerge, along with easier access to raw materials. This has intensified competition, especially from Russia, which is expanding its Arctic infrastructure, and China, which is investing in order to increase its influence. For Washington, critical minerals, including rare earths, are therefore becoming a potential alternative to Chinese-dominated supply chains.

Active agreements between the United States and Denmark

As we approach the year 2026, the United States’ involvement in Greenland is governed by a collection of defence and cooperation agreements that are still in effect. On the strategic level, Greenland, as part of Denmark, falls under the purview of the NATO treaty. The bilateral ‘Greenland Defense Agreement’ between the US and Denmark, signed on April 27, 1951, allows the US to establish ‘defence areas’ and facilities. A permanent Joint Committee is in place to oversee these matters. Since 1955, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement has also governed the legal standing of American forces in Greenland. The Danish Realm arrangement includes the Itilleq Declaration (2003) and the Self-Government Act (2009), which guarantee Nuuk a say in foreign and security policy issues. In practice, consent is necessary before setting up any new military installations. The Igaliku Agreement of August 6, 2004, revised the 1951 trilateral treaty. Pituffik/Thule remains the sole designated defence zone. All these agreements are deemed active or valid in 2026.

Military activity of the United States today

The United States currently maintains a single military base in Greenland, the Pituffik Space Base, located in northwestern Greenland, near the town of Qaanaaq. There are no other permanent US facilities; since the trilateral Igaliku Agreement of 2004, Pituffik has been considered the only defined US “defence area” on the island. Its primary function is as a sensor and support site, with a particular focus on the AN/FPS-132, which is operated by the 12th Space Warning Squadron on a round-the-clock basis. This radar system serves as an early warning system for NORAD, enhancing their situational awareness and facilitating missile defence and space situational awareness efforts. Additionally, the 22nd Space Operations Squadron’s Detachment 7 (‘POGO’) manages a satellite ground station for polar military satellites that is part of the Satellite Control Network. The 821st Space Base Group handles operations, logistics, and security, with the participation of Danish and Greenlandic personnel, including a Danish liaison officer. The population fluctuates seasonally between around 550 and 600 individuals, with a significant number of contractors. The base boasts a 3,047-meter-long runway that remains operational year-round, as well as the northernmost deep-water port. Goods are brought in bulk during the summer as part of ‘Operation Pacer Goose’, while air transport takes over in the winter. No permanent weapons are stationed there, but Pituffik serves as a hub for C-130 operations, among other things.

Agreements and attempts at influencing.

The United States’ influence over Greenland is not a recent development. In 1867 and 1868, William H. Seward, the Secretary of State at the time, considered acquiring Greenland, as well as Iceland. In 1916, during the purchase of the Danish West Indies, the United States formally recognized Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. During World War II, the ‘Kauffmann Agreement’ of 1941 marked the operational entry: Washington effectively took over the protection of Greenland and received base and access rights. In 1946, President Truman secretly offered 100 million dollars to purchase Greenland. This proposal was rejected in Copenhagen. With Denmark’s entry into NATO in 1949, Greenland came under the protection of the alliance. The ‘Greenland Defense Agreement’, signed in 1951, regulated the United States’ long-term presence. As a result, between 1951 and 1953, Operation Blue Jay was initiated, leading to the establishment of Thule Air Base (now Pituffik) and the relocation of the local Inuit. In 1955, the Joint Chiefs once again suggested acquiring the land. At the same time, a missile prototype was buried under the ice at Camp Century as part of Project Iceworm from 1959 to 1967. The following year, the BMEWS radar system was incorporated. Most recently, in 2004, the Igaliku Agreement solidified Greenland’s consultation rights. Since 2019, the ‘purchase’ narrative and US presence policy have resurfaced, including the establishment of a consulate in Nuuk.

Geostrategy

Greenland has military significance because it acts as a ‘hinge’ between North America and Europe, shaping access from the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic. In this way, the island sits at the core of the North Atlantic’s security architecture: the GIUK gap (Greenland – Iceland – UK), which serves as a critical chokepoint for monitoring submarines and regulating reinforcement routes between North America and Europe. Furthermore, Greenland is situated on the shortest route across the Arctic. In the face of potential missile or bomber attacks in the region, prompt detection and analysis of the situation are of the utmost importance. The strategic core of the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule) is exactly this: it acts as a central sensor node for missile early warning, missile defence support, and space domain awareness. It is also integrated into NORAD’s Integrated Warning and Situation Picture. Furthermore, Greenland is included in NATO’s defensive umbrella over Denmark (Article 5/6), which extends north of the Arctic Circle. This not only enhances the island’s geographical deterrence, but also aligns with the alliance’s policy.

Melting ice: Routes, Russia, China.

The changing climate is causing the Arctic’s sea ice to melt earlier, making it possible to navigate through previously impassable waters for longer periods each year. This increased usability is significant enough to influence strategic considerations. In the future, longer navigation windows are expected along the Russian Northeast Passage (Northern Sea Route) and, subject to ice and weather conditions, north of Greenland. The Northwest Passage, which runs near Canada and Greenland, is also set to benefit from these changes. This will increase traffic volumes and accident risks, as well as the need for reliable search and rescue and maritime situation awareness in the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean. For Russia, the development of new routes and ice-free waters serves both economic and strategic purposes. Over the years, Moscow has been investing in Arctic infrastructure, reactivating or building dozens of sites, including airfields and ports, and supporting the route with the world’s largest fleet of icebreakers. Militarily, this facilitates access from the Barents Sea to the Atlantic. This has ambivalent consequences for Western defence: longer ice-free periods make it easier to supply ships, but they also allow Russia to get closer to critical sensing and infrastructure. China is positioning itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and promoting a Polar Silk Road, with an interest in shipping, infrastructure, and resources. Western states view this as an attempt to convert economic influence into strategic presence.

Unprocessed resource reserves and initiatives (USA/Greenland/Denmark)

Greenland possesses a wealth of ‘critical raw materials’ that are being considered in Washington, particularly in relation to supply chains. These valuable resources encompass a wide range of elements, such as rare earths (including heavy rare earths), zinc/lead, iron ore, and even rare gems. Estimated rare-earth resources total approximately 36 million tonnes of REO, with reserves of around 1.5 million tonnes. Key projects are underway in places like Kuannersuit/Kvanefjeld, Tanbreez, and Sarfartoq, among others. Kvanefjeld is politically blocked because the deposit contains uranium impurities. In 2021, Greenland banned uranium mining. Tanbreez was acquired by Critical Metals Corp. in 2025, while Sarfartoq has been explored by Neo Performance Materials since 2022. For Nuuk, extracting raw materials represents both a lever for diversification and a way to strengthen autonomy. Copenhagen is in favour of the Realm arrangement, which includes measures to make Chinese offers less appealing. US efforts are primarily focused on ‘enablement’. In 2019, a memorandum of understanding was signed on the search for critical minerals and the transfer of know-how. In addition, a US aid package was launched in 2020, which includes raw material mapping, among other things.

Why did the debate resume in 2026?

The escalation in 2026 is not so much a ‘sudden dispute over an island’ as it is the culmination of a long-simmering political conflict driven by strategic interests. Starting at the end of 2024 and into early 2025, the second Trump administration made Greenland a contentious power play. They framed the United States’‘possession’ or ‘control’ of Greenland as a matter of national security, using intimidation tactics such as tariff threats and the suggestion of maintaining military options. Secondly, this rhetoric coincides with an increase in the perception of threat in the Arctic. Pituffik is a highly relevant hub for missile early warning, missile defence support and space situational awareness. At the same time, modernization and possible upgrades to defend against new missile profiles, including hypersonic weapons, are being discussed. This is politically ‘charging’ the location and sovereignty issues. Third, the conflict was concretized in January 2026 by symbolic politics: a Danish-led exercise with a multinational presence was seen as a provocation by Trump, who responded with punitive tariffs. Allies unanimously rejected these measures. Despite de-escalation in Davos, the underlying dispute remained unresolved. Since then, Washington has been considering ‘softer’ models, such as leases or the Compact of Free Association (COFA). However, Nuuk and Copenhagen have emphasized sovereignty and self-determination.